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WATCH YOUR E-MAIL! EMPLOYEE E-MAIL
MONITORING AND PRIVACY LAW IN THE
AGE OF THE "ELECTRONIC SWEATSHOP"
LAURIE THOMAS LEE*
INTRODUCTION

Employee privacy is considered to be the most significant
workplace issue facing companies today.1 A recent survey of American businesses by MacWorld magazine suggests that twenty
million Americans may be subject to some type of electronic monitoring through their computers on the job.2 Employer access to
what employees thought were private electronic mail (E-mail) files
is especially raising eyebrows. The same study reveals that of
those companies that engage in electronic monitoring practices,
over forty percent have searched employee E-mail files.3 This is
particularly troubling when less than one-third of all admitted
electronic surveillants say they ever warn employees,4 and only
eighteen percent of companies even have a written policy on electronic monitoring.'
E-mail is considered to be the fastest growing form of electronic communication in the workplace, but the laws addressing
employee privacy rights with respect to E-mail are unclear. Little
conclusive research has been done on the legality of E-mail moni-
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Ph.D. Mass Media (Telecommunications), Michigan State University,
1993; M.A., University of Iowa, 1983; B.S., Kearney State College, 1982. Dr. Lee is
currently an Assistant Professor in the Department of Broadcasting, College of
Journalism and Mass Communications at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln.
1. At the American Civil Liberties Union, violations of privacy at the workplace have become the largest category among its 50,000 complaints received each
year. Peter Blackman & Barbara Franklin, Blocking Big Brother; Proposed Law
Limits Employers' Right to Snoop, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 19, 1993, at 5.
2. Charles Piller, Bosses With X-Ray Eyes, MACWORLD, July 1993, at 188, 120.
MacWorld conducted a survey of 301 businesses about employee monitoring. More
than 21 percent of the respondents indicated that they have searched computer
files, voice mail, E-mail, or other networking communications. For companies of
more than 1,000 employees, that figure rises to 30 percent.
3. Id. at 123. An informal survey by the San Jose Mercury News of top Silicon
Valley companies also found a majority retain the right to review E-mail, and no
company said it would not read other people's E-mail. E-mail Snoopers No Secret,
RECORD, Apr. 21, 1994, at D02.
4. Piller, supra note 2, at 122.
5. Id. at 120.
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toring. Do employers have the right to look at an employee's Email messages? Do employees have a right to privacy that bars
corporate snooping?
This Article examines the privacy debate and the legality of
E-mail monitoring in the workplace. Part I explains the far-reaching effects of E-mail monitoring and elucidates the divergent arguments in the debate for and against stricter controls. Part II
begins the legal analysis by exploring the constitutionality of Email monitoring. Part III examines federal and state statutory
law. Part IV of this Article examines E-mail monitoring under the
common law, focusing on employee privacy rights. Part V explains
that several bill are now pending in Congress that are intended to7
either limit employer access' or permit workplace monitoring.
Finally, Part VI proposes some guidelines for balancing employee
privacy and corporate monitoring needs.

I. E-MAIL MONITORING
With an estimated forty million E-mail users expected to be
sending sixty billion messages by the year 2000, it is no wonder
that corporate America is closely watching to see how the courts
and Congress will handle the E-mail monitoring issues.' Electronic mail has become an indispensable tool that has revolutionized the workplace. More workers are able to communicate everything from simple memos to complex business plans to colleagues
and clients across the hall or around the world in a matter of
seconds. Companies and employees alike recognize the benefits of
a technology that has the power to speed communication and
improve productivity and efficiency.9 At a time of fierce international competition, few employers can afford to pass up any opportunities E-mail provides.

6. S. 984, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 139 CONG. REC. S6122 (1993); and H.R. 1900,
103d Cong., 1st Sess., 139 CONG. REC. E1077 (1993).
7. S. 311, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 139 CONG. REC. S1390 (1993).
8. Scott Dean, E-Mail Forces Companies to Grapple With Privacy Issues, CORP.
LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 1993, at 11. Corporate E-mail has grown 83 percent among the
Fortune 2000 firms between 1991 and 1993, and nine out of ten locations employing over 1,000 workers in the U.S. now uses E-mail. John Thackery, ElectronicMail Boxes a Dumping Ground for Meaningless Data, OTTAWA CITIZEN, May 28,
1994, at B4 (citing projections by the Electronic Messaging Association).
9. For example, E-mail can be used to enhance a company's effectiveness by
facilitating the flow of communications among employees at all levels, reducing
"telephone tag," and resulting in a cost savings from reduced paper and postage
usage. James J. Cappel, Closing the E-mail Privacy Gap; Employer Monitoring of
Employee E-mail, J. Sys. MGMT., Dec. 1993, at 6. E-mail also allows users to send
messages on any day (i.e., on weekends) and at any time of day (i.e., at 2 a.m.),
does not require the simultaneous presence of the recipient, and allows messages
tc be sent to more than one recipient at a time.
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Yet the accessibility of corporate-owned E-mail systems also
presents a compelling new opportunity for company executives to
"sneak a peak" at intracompany and intercompany communications in order to monitor employees and maintain control over the
workplace. E-mail messages can easily be intercepted and read by
not only system managers and operators, but by anyone with a
working knowledge of and access to the corporate network.1 ° In
some cases, corporate executives may simply "ask" network administrators to present them with an employee's E-mail files."
In general, administrators will often monitor the message traffic
and store E-mail as a permanent electronic record, and in some
cases make and store printed copies. 2 Of course, messages are
also vulnerable if employees are not given passwords to log into
their mail, simply stay logged-in when they are away from their
computers, or inadvertently route their messages to unintended
recipients."3 While some encryption technology is available or
being developed for E-mail systems, 4 few companies may use
encryption because of cost and efficiency factors. 5 Some type of
E-mail security is desperately needed."8

10. See Piller, supra note 2. MacWorld examined some E-mail products for their

ability to be invaded. Id.
11. Doug vanKirk, IS Managers Balance Privacy Rights and Risks; Proactive
Companies are Establishing Clear Guidelines and Informing Employees,
INFOWORLD, Nov. 29, 1993, at 65.
12. This is what happened in 1990 when the Mayor of Colorado Springs, Colorado, admitted he had been reading the electronic mail that city council members
had sent to one another. Don J. DeBenedictis, E-Mail Snoops, A.B.A. J., Sept.
1990, at 26. An E-mail policy had required that messages be printed periodically
and be deleted to save space on the city computer. Id. The printouts were kept in
case any messages were deemed covered by the state's public-records law. Id.
13. The ease of replying to E-mail messages and sending messages to many
people on a "whim" (as compared to sending ordinary letters) can also exacerbate
the monitoring problem in terms of what may be communicated and regrettably
read. A notorious example is that of Officer Lawrence Powell who, after the beating of Rodney King, broadcast an E-mail message over the Los Angeles Police
Department system saying, "Oops, I haven't beaten anyone so bad in a long time."
John K. Keitt, Jr. & Cynthia L. Kahn, Cyberspace Snooping, LEGAL TIMES, May 2,
1994, at 24.
14. See, e.g., Reuven M. Lerner, ProtectingE-mail, TECH. REV., Sept. 1992, at
11, which discusses the use of public-key cryptosystems which grant the receiver of
any E-mail sole access to its contents. See also Stephen T. Kent, Internet Privacy
Enhanced Mail: Development of Security Standardsfor Internet Computer Network,
COMM. ACM, Aug. 1993, at 48 (discussing Internet security concerns).
15. Dean, supra note 8.
16. E-mail security technology is lagging behind, yet software makers are reportedly hesitant to develop encryption programs because the Clinton administration may soon require them to use "backdoors"-i.e., with the "Clipper Chip'-that
would allow authorized federal agencies like the F.B.I. to break the code and retrieve messages. See, e.g., Winn Schwartau, Crypto Policy and Business Privacy:
The Clinton Administration's Proposed Clipper Chip Workplace Privacy, PC WK.,

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 28:137

Some employees are already finding this out the hard way. In
what is believed to be the first publicly known E-mail case from
1990, an E-mail administrator for Epson America, Inc., discovered
a supervisor reading all employee E-mail originating from outside
the company. Alana Shoars had been told to reassure some 700
Epson employees that their E-mail would be private. When she
complained about the monitoring, she was fired. 17 In another
case, two system administrators of the California-based Nissan
subsidiary's E-mail network were fired after filing a grievance
alleging that their privacy had been invaded when their boss read
their E-mail and had subsequently fired them."s Perhaps the
most notorious case of E-mail insecurity involved Oliver North
and John Poindexter who were communicating through E-mail in
the system at the National Security Council. Although they
thought they had sufficiently deleted their messages, back-up
tapes had been made and were allowed as evidence for use by
prosecutors in the Iran-Contra investigation. 9 A more recent
civil suit that is still pending may have serious implications for
anyone who uses E-mail at work. In 1992, a former Borland International Vice President defected to a rival computer software
maker, but not before allegedly forwarding trade secrets via
Borland's MCI Mail. Borland executives obtained the departing
Vice President's password and discovered the messages which it
intended to use as evidence against the former employee." However, because MCI Mail was used as opposed to an intracompany
E-mail system, a different legal analysis may come into play.2
June 28, 1993, at 207.
17. Electronic Mail Raises Issues About Privacy, Experts Say, Daily Lab. Rep.,
(BNA) No. 222, at A-7 (Nov. 17, 1992) [hereinafter Electronic Mail Raises Issues];
Nicole Casarez, Electronic Mail and Employee Relations: Why Privacy Must Be
Considered, PUB. REL. Q., Summer 1992, at 37; Piller, supra note 2; Lynn Schwebach, Reconciling ElectronicPrivacy Rights in the Workplace, PC TODAY, Jan. 1992,
at 38. She sued and a class action suit followed, but both cases were thrown out.
Appeals are pending. See infra note 162 for a discussion of the Epson case.
18. Dean, supra note 8. Their E-mail had included jokes, racy personal messages, and criticism of the boss. See infra note 162 for a discussion of the Nissan Email situation.
19. Alice Kahn, Electronic Eavesdropping,S.F. CHRON., Oct. 31, 1991, at D3. In
January 1993, a U.S. District Court Judge for the District of Columbia ruled that
the tapes are official records and cannot be destroyed. Dean, supra note 8, and
Keitt, Jr. & Kahn, supra note 13. This case, however, involved government communications which are subject to a different legal analysis. See infra notes 35-52 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the constitutionality of searches of government employees.
20. Dean, supra note 8. In a similar case, two computer programmers who
worked for Mentor Graphics, a software company in San Jose, California, were
fired for allegedly disclosing trade secrets to a rival computer company. The disclosure was discovered while monitoring E-mail messages sent over Internet. The
case was settled in early 1992. Electronic Mail Raises Issues, supra note 17, at A-7.
21. Piller, supra note 2, at 122; Dean, supra note 8. See infra notes 70-71 and
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A legal solution will not be without compromise because both
proponents and opponents of E-mail monitoring are prepared to
do battle. Proponents of E-mail monitoring are employers interested in protecting their corporate secrets as well as controlling their
workplace. Opponents of monitoring are the employees, labor
unions, and advocacy groups. The following section delineates
both sides of the debate between employer monitoring and employee privacy.
A. The Debate
Legislation now before Congress addresses some of the issues
of electronic monitoring in the workplace, including E-mail," but
not everyone is backing the measures. Proponents of stricter controls, including union leaders and advocacy groups, argue that
without some reasonable restrictions, the nation runs the risk of
turning workplaces into what are being coined as "electronic sweatshops," where constant monitoring freely occurs.23 Yet virtually
every business lobbying group in Washington is lining up against
proposed legislation that would curtail their ability to monitor the
workplace.
Historically, employers have always monitored their workers'
performance by observing production lines, counting sales orders,
and simply looking over an employee's shoulder. Encroachment on
employee privacy has strong traditions, from the advent of the
industrial age and production line monitoring to employee psychological testing and more recently, drug screening. But today, the
product of more businesses is service and information, which requires a different type of monitoring approach. In addition, new
technologies have ushered in more ways to overhear, watch, or
read just about anything in the workplace, 4 including E-mail.
There are concerns that these new forms of monitoring are

accompanying text for a discussion of the relevant law which came into play because MCI mail was used.
22. S. 984, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 139 CONG. REC. S6122 (1993); H.R. 1900, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess., 139 CONG. REC. E1077 (1993); and S. 311, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.,
139 CONG. REC. S1390 (1993).
23. Lini Kadaba, Employer Eavesdropping Debated: Workers Say it Stresses
Them Out; Companies Content They Have Right, PHOENIX GAZETTE, Oct. 8, 1993,
at C6; Bruce Phillips, UncontrolledEmployee Monitoring Raises Threatof Electronic Sweatshops, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Sept. 1, 1993, at All.
24. For example, electronic cards and "Active Badges" can reveal a worker's
presence and location, call accounting systems can show how many calls and facsimiles were made and to whom, and computer programs can record when and how
long an employee was logged onto a computer. See, e.g., Blackman & Franklin,
supra note 1; Phillips, supra note 23; Larry Tye & Marla Van Schuyver, Technology Tests Privacy in the Workplace: No Private Lives, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 6, 1993,
at 13.
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diminishing the privacy rights of millions of workers, and opponents fear that the workplace monitoring problem will only be
exacerbated by even newer technologies being developed. Proponents of legislation to limit electronic monitoring argue that the
need for employee privacy protection is now. They point to the
recent MacWorld survey" and other studies26 that reveal an
alarming amount of electronic surveillance of workers-much of it
done surreptitiously. They argue that employees are entitled to
human dignity and should not have to leave their right of privacy
behind when they go through the office door. Moreover, people
should be able to assume their mail is private, whether they are
sending it via the Postal Service or an electronic method. There
are fears of abuse by employers reading E-mail for non-legitimate
reasons such as voyeurism and paranoia. In addition, studies2 7
show that employee surveillance in general takes its toll on workers and companies in terms of stress, fatigue, apprehension, motivation, morale, and trust; this results in increased absenteeism,
turnover, poorer management, and lower productivity," not to
mention higher health-care costs.
On the other hand, the corporate world2" argues that they

25. Piller, supra note 2, at 123.
26. For example, a 1991 study by the Society for Human Resource Management
of its members found that eleven percent of the 1,493 respondents used video cameras to monitor workers; eight percent, computer terminal; and five percent, telephone taps. Kadaba, supra note 23. In 1990, a study of 186 New York metropolitan
area companies found 73-roughly 40 percent-were engaging in some type of
electronic surveillance of their employees. Gene Bylinsky, How Companies Spy on
Employees, FORTUNE, Nov. 4, 1991, at 131, 132. On the other hand, a study by
Robert Half International, Inc., revealed that only 44 percent of companies surveyed had a written code of ethics communicated to employees. Schwebach, supra
note 17. Employees also seem to be naive about company monitoring practices. A
Louis Harris Associates Survey of 1000 workers at 300 companies found more than
90 percent think that employers collect only information that is relevant and necessary. Lee Smith, What the Boss Knows About You, FORTUNE, Aug. 9, 1993, at 88.
27. These studies include one conducted by the University of Wisconsin that revealed that monitored telecommunications workers suffered more from depression,
anxiety, and fatigue than non-monitored workers at the same plant. Blackman &
Franklin, supra note 1, at 5. A Massachusetts survey showed that at companies
monitoring for efficiency, 65 percent of employees could not perform their tasks
effectively because they were required to work too fast. Id.
28. For a related discussion, see Ernest Kallman, Electronic Monitoring of Employees: Issues & Guidelines, J. SYS. MGMT., June 1993, at 17.
29. Trade associations and others are taking different stances on the debate.
Richard A. Danca, PrivacyAct Would Force Firms to Inform Their Employees About
E-Mail Monitoring: Privacy Issue Comes of Age in the Networked World, PC WK.,
June 28, 1993, at 203. The ACLU's Task Force on Civil Liberties in the Workplace
takes the position that companies should not open employee E-mail, although other
organizations are also amenable to the corporate view. Id. The Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR), which in fact lobbied Congress to specifically include E-mail in its proposed legislation, says that companies should give
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need to reserve the right to electronically monitor job performance
and work-related activities in order to investigate and prevent
theft, fraud, insider trading, drug dealing, and other illegal conduct, as well as to assure productivity, efficiency, and quality control." Employers use monitoring for such purposes as evaluating
employees and ensuring that customer and client relations are
handled properly.3" Critics of legislation restricting employer access argue that what takes place on company premises over company phones and E-mail networks belongs to the company which
has a right to access the work product for which it is paying. They
contend that employers have a legitimate right to a fair day's
work and to be able to ensure that work is accomplished by being
able to keep track of personal use of company equipment and
other abuse. Warning employees of when they will be monitored
defeats the purpose. Moreover, they argue that limiting access
would mean that employers might not be able to access an
employee's E-mail in emergency situations.32
Unless adequate legislation is passed, workers subjected to E-

individuals more privacy, but that company policies could spell out monitoring
practices. Id. The Electronic Frontier Foundation in Washington comes down on
the side of privacy but agrees that if a monitoring policy is presented to employees,
that employees are effectively giving the company permission to monitor their Email. Id. On the other hand, the Computer and Business Equipment Manufacturers Association considers computer monitoring to be a legitimate management tool,
and the Electronic Mail Association (EMA), which represents E-mail suppliers and
corporate users, agrees. Id. While company policies spelling out privacy are good,
EMA Executive Director William Moroney thinks that "employers need the right to
control, evaluate, and monitor all forms of employee communication." Id. The EMA
essentially believes that employees should not expect any more of a right of privacy with E-mail than they would get from tossing a memo in their out-basket. Id.
30. According to the MacWorld survey, nearly half of the managers surveyed
endorse the concept of electronic monitoring. Piller, supra note 2, at 121. Four
percent endorse it "for routinely verifying employee honesty." Id. A much higher
number, 23 percent, feel electronic monitoring is a good tool where reasonable evidence of wrongdoing, such as theft or negligence, comes to light. Id.
31. Terry Morehead Dworkin, Protecting Private Employees From Enhanced
Monitoring: Legislative Approaches, 28 AM. BUS. L.J. 59 (Spring 1990). A study by
Ernest Kallman found several specific arguments for employing electronic monitoring in general. Kallman, supra note 28, at 17. The primary argument put forth by
management is to increase productivity. Id. The second argument is that electronic
monitoring allows management to do a better job of personnel management since it
provides a more objective appraisal. Finally, it improves the performance appraisal
process. Id.
32. For example, there are concerns that if a newspaper working on a major
story relied on some key information stuck in a reporter's E-mail, the newspaper
would not be able to access the information if the reporter was not available to give
permission. Likewise, if a purchase order were sent via E-mail to a specific recipient who was unavailable, no one else in that office would be able to access the file
to process the order. Bob Brown, E-Mail Users Voice Concern About Pending Legislation, NETWORK WORLD, Aug. 23, 1993, at 6.
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mail searches will have to turn to the existing laws for possible
recourse. These laws are virtually untested as they pertain to
employee E-mail and privacy rights. The following sections explore what federal and state constitutional and statutory prOvisions might apply to employee E-mail monitoring and examine the
existing tort law remedies.
II. E-MAIL PRIVACY RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
An examination of the highest source of law reveals that
Constitutional privacy rights,3 3 as they might pertain to employees, are very limited in scope. The Fourth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution provides that the "right of people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated... ."4 Most states
also have a similar constitutional provision that provides similar
protection. Yet the U.S. Constitution (and most state
constitutions)35 only prohibit searches and seizures by the government and not by the private sector.3" Thus, in an employment
context, only government employees may claim a Constitutional
privacy right should their E-mail be accessed; nongovernment
employees have no Constitutional guarantee of privacy in the
workplace, unless infringed by a government search or seizure.37
While privacy protection afforded to public employees is beyond the scope of this Article, it is nonetheless instructive to briefly examine and compare the scope of these rights and the analysis
used. For government employees (or employees subject to E-mail
searches by the government) these rights are limited and may not
be upheld. So far, no case law specifically addresses a constitutional right of privacy related to E-mail, so courts may rely on
precedents associated with similar types of electronic surveillance
such as the monitoring or recording of telephone communications.
Here, the Supreme Court and lower courts have generally ruled in
favor of the government infringers.
Section A initially discusses those federal and Supreme Court
decisions relating to monitoring telephone communications. Sec-

33. A right of privacy is not explicitly stated in the U.S. Constitution, although
it has an implicit textual basis found in several amendments such as the Fourth
Amendment. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

35. See infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relevant
privacy provisions of several states' constitutions.
36. The Search and Seizure clause of the U.S. Constitution does not protect
citizens from unreasonable searches by private parties. See, e.g., United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1984); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419
U.S. 345, 349 (1974).
37. In this sense, one might observe that private employees actually enjoy less
privacy protection than those working for the government.
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tion B applies the tests formulated from those opinions that determine when monitoring violates the Constitutional right to privacy.
Finally, section C analyzes state constitutions in relation to the
Constitution, concentrating on the California State constitution
which contains a specific privacy provision for private sector protection.
A. The United States Constitution
The Supreme Court tends to rule in favor of the alleged infringer in monitoring privacy cases. In the landmark privacy case
Katz v. U.S., 3" and the subsequent case Smith v. Maryland,39
the Supreme Court defined the parameters within which government agencies may engage in telephone monitoring without warrants.4 ° The Court relied on its two-part test which essentially
determines whether the plaintiff exhibited a reasonable "expectation of privacy."4' Whether an "expectation of privacy" exists (and
thus whether a plaintiffs suit might be successful) depends on a
number of factors such as the private nature of the information
involved and whether the individual had "knowingly exposed" the
information.42 In Smith, the Court determined that the plaintiff
had no expectation of privacy when a pen register employed by a
telephone company at police request had recorded the telephone
numbers he had dialed from his home. The Court stated that "[aill
subscribers realize ...

that the phone company has facilities for

38. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
39. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
40. In Katz, F.B.I. agents acting without a warrant attached a listening device
to the outside of a public phone booth to monitor the defendant's conversation. 389
U.S. at 348. In Smith, a telephone company used a pen register at police request to

record the numbers dialed from the home of a man suspected of placing threatening calls to a robbery victim. 442 U.S. at 737.
41. This standard was first enunciated in Katz and later adopted in Smith. It
first asks whether the individual, by his or her conduct, has "exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy," id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring), having
shown that he or she "seeks to preserve (something) as private." Id. at 351. The
second part of the analysis is whether the individual's subjective expectation of privacy is "one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" Id. at 361.
(Harlan, J., concurring). Most adjudication has relied on the second part of the
inquiry, which remains the prevailing authority. See, e.g., Amsterdam, Perspectives
on the FourthAmendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974) (discussing the reasonableness analysis of privacy cases).
42. Other criteria include whether there was a legitimate purpose or "compelling government interest" in the seizure/disclosure of the information; what alternatives were available; whether a property right could be maintained; and what
precautions were taken. For an analysis of these criteria, see Laurie Thomas Lee,
Constitutional and Common Law Informational Privacy: Proposing a "Reasonable
Needs" Approach for New Technologies, Paper Presented to the AEJMC Annual
Convention, Kansas City (Aug. 1993) (unpublished manuscript on file with The
John Marshall Law Review).
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making permanent records of the numbers they dial.. .

."'

The

Court also concluded that an expectation of privacy in this case
would not be reasonable because Smith had "voluntarily conveyed
numerical information to the telephone company and 'exposed'
that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business.""
Applying the Smith standard to E-mail suggests that an
employee's privacy interest in E-mail messages would likewise fail
the "expectation of privacy" test since most users probably realize
that a system administrator could have access to their E-mail
accounts. Although most users assume that the administrator will
not examine their mail, 45 they have nonetheless "voluntarily conveyed" the information. Moreover, if government employers have a
publicized policy on this type of electronic monitoring, then the
employee has generally assumed the risk that his or her messages
will be searched. In fact, courts have recently held that a publicized monitoring policy reduces an employee's expectation of privacy as to the contents of his desk" or locker. 47 For the same
reasons, private sector employees would likewise fail the expectation of privacy test and be vulnerable to E-mail searches by the
government. Moreover, if the government (i.e., the police, F.B.I.,
etc.) is voluntarily offered the contents of any public or private
sector employee's E-mail file by a third party (e.g., a co-worker),
then a Constitutional right is not invoked."

43. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979).
44. Id. at 744. The Court has also relied on the "knowingly exposed" criterion in
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (where a "beeper" had been attached
to an individual's car for tracking purposes, and an automobile otherwise travels
over publicly viewed roads), and in California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986)
(where a homeowner complained of the government flying over, observing, and
photographing his fenced-in backyard, otherwise observable from overhead).
45. Piller, supra note 2, at 118. This is because of the large volume of messages
being transmitted over the system and a perception that an E-mail administrator
or operator would otherwise be disinterested. This assumption is probably valid,
although telephone companies, too, have little interest in any one phone call of
thousands, although some interceptions do still occur for various reasons.
46. Schowengerdt v. United States, 944 F.2d 483, 488-89 (9th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 1514 (1992).
47. American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 871 F.2d
556, 560 (6th Cir. 1989).
48. A recent E-mail snooping allegation may serve as an example here. At the
University of Nebraska at Omaha, computer administrators allegedly read student
E-mail messages without their permission, but supposedly to help law enforcement
authorities. In one case, computer files of one student were turned over to police
pursuing a felony investigation. See E-mail Snooping Alleged; UNO Administrators
May Have Eavesdropped, LINCOLN J., Mar. 30, 1994. If the administrators voluntarily released the contents to the authorities on their own initiative (or a warrant
had been properly issued), then a constitutional right would not likely be found.
See, e.g., "false friend" cases such as Couch v. U.S., 409 U.S. 322 (1973); United
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Even if the courts find a reasonable expectation of privacy in
E-mail, then the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure
would then be analyzed. This analysis requires a balancing of the
nature of the intrusion against the importance of the government
interests justifying the intrusion. In one of the few cases where
the Supreme Court has considered public employees' privacy interests, it found that a public employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office desk and file cabinets.49 In fact, the
Court noted that "not everything that passes through the confines
of the business address can be considered part of the workplace
context."'0 But the Court also noted that the reasonableness of a
"search" requires balancing the privacy interest against the government's need for supervision, control, and efficiency as an employer. A government search may be considered reasonable if there
are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will reveal
worker misconduct, and the search was limited to accomplishing
the underlying objectives.51 Thus, a decision rendered in a case
involving E-mail may turn on an assessment of the reasonableness of the search and a balancing of the interests and needs. In
general, courts have tended to find that an employer's needs outweigh the employee's privacy interest, and in subsequent employee search cases, the Supreme Court has found the government's
interest to prevail.52 Thus, in applying the same criteria and balancing test to E-mail, the courts may find no Constitutional privacy rights infringed.
B. State Constitutions
Like the Constitution, most state constitutions will only protect privacy rights belonging to government employees or others
subject to government monitoring. 3 While most states contain

States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966);
Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); see also California v. Greenwood, 486
U.S. 35 (1988); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
49. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 719.
52. In one case, the Court concluded that suspicionless drug testing of railroad
employees was reasonable in the interest of railroad safety. Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executive's Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 633 (1989). In another case, the Court upheld a drug screen program for U.S. Customs Service employees involved in such
activities as drug interdiction. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656 (1989).
53. See, e.g., Bianco v. American Broadcasting Co., 470 F. Supp. (N.D. Ill. 1979)
(holding that an employer's electronic eavesdropping of employees did not violate
an Illinois constitutional provision prohibiting interceptions by eavesdropping devices, since the constitutional provision limits only governmental activity and not
private activities).
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provisions similar to the Fourth Amendment, a few state constitutions do recognize an explicit right to privacy.54 However, only
one state, California, has generally provided a constitutional privacy right that can be invoked by employees subject to private
sector searches. Still, New Jersey recently recognized a state constitutional right of privacy5 which may be applied to the private
sector workplace.56 Moreover, the Alaska Supreme Court, while
finding that Alaska's constitutional privacy provision does not
apply to private actors, nonetheless recently noted that its constitutional provision might form the basis for a "public policy supporting privacy."57 Thus, a trend toward more state constitutional privacy protections for private sector employees may be emerging.
In California, the courts have held that the right to privacy
in the state constitution applies with equal force to those in both
the private and public sector." The California courts have generally held that the state constitution prohibits all incursions into
individual privacy unless justified by a "compelling interest." As
with the Supreme Court, there is no clear answer as to how a
California court will decide an E-mail privacy claim without first
knowing the employer's justification for the search. However,
California law does not extend to California companies and employees if the search or seizure by the employer occurs out of
state. It will be instructive, however, to analyze the state's reactions to the few E-mail privacy cases which are still pending-since all of these cases happen to reside in California.59

54. See infra Table 1 for the state constitutions which expressly protect privacy.
55. N.J.S.A. CONST. art. 1, par. 1. This states that "[A]1 persons are by nature
free and independent and have certain natural and inalienable rights, among
which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing,
and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness." Id.
56. Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 609 A.2d 11 (N.J. 1992). In this
case, the Supreme Court of New Jersey nonetheless upheld an employer's discharge of an employee following a positive drug test. Id. at 23.
57. Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 1132-33 (Alaska
1989), second appeal, 834 P.2d 1220. It also found that public policy entitled private employers to withhold private information from their employers. 768 P.2d at
1131-33.
58. See, e.g., Porten v. University of San Francisco, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1976)
(finding a private university improperly disclosed a student's grades from another
university to the State Scholarship and Loan Commission); see also Valley Bank of
Nevada v. Superior Court, 542 P.2d 977 (Cal. 1975) (where similarly, a private
entity was prevented from disclosing another entity's financial records).
59. See supra note 20, and accompanying text for a description of one California
E-mail intrusion case. See infra notes 159 for a discussion of similar invasions of
privacy.
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III. FEDERAL AND STATE STATUTORY LAW: E-MAIL WIRETAPPING
Both private and public employees may turn to current federal and state statutory law to contest an employer's "right" to Email monitoring, but may again find little relief. The relevant
federal law, although facially applicable to E-mail, may fail to
protect individual privacy in this area because of possible ambiguity and the presence of several exceptions. These exceptions include the non-interstate systems exception, the prior consent exception, and the business use exception. The relevant state statutes also fail to adequately limit monitoring. Section A addresses
the applicable federal statutory law. Section B discusses the pertinent state statutes.
A. Federal Statutes
The key federal law to date in this area is the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), ° which bars the
interception of electronic communications. The ECPA would seem
to protect workers from many types of electronic monitoring including E-mail interceptions, but it is not explicit when it comes
to the workplace, and it contains some exceptions that courts may
determine exclude employee protection.
Congress adopted the ECPA in 1986 as an amendment to
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968,"' commonly known as the federal wiretapping statute. The
intention was to update the law's language to encompass new
technologies and to expand its scope62 to include the interception
of electronic communications and stored electronic communications, such as between computers or between a computer and a
human.' In fact, the ECPA was also intended to include coverage of private communication systems such as intracompany networks.'

60. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 25102521, 2701-2710, 3117, 3121-3126 (1988)).
61. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2520 (1970 & Supp. 1994).

62. Congress believed the ECPA was necessary because the 1968 Act initially
protected only against aural interception of voice communications, and the privacy
protection was limited to narrowly defined "wire" and "oral" communications. It did
not cover data communications. See U.S. v. Gregg, 629 F. Supp. 958 (W.D. Mo.
1986) (prompting the ECPA amendments because the court found that Title III,
which regulated the "interception of wire and oral communications," did not apply
to the interception of telex communications; telex interceptions did not involve
'aural acquisition" of defendant's communications), affd, 829 F.2d 1430 (8th Cir.
1987).

63. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(1), (4), (12), (17) (Supp. 1994).
64. S. REP. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3566.
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The ECPA does not directly mention electronic mail, but it is
included within the scope of the act's general protections. The
ECPA forbids, for example, the interception of electronic communications, which, according to the legislative history, includes Email."5 The ECPA further defines an "electronic communication
service" as one that provides to users the "ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications,"6 which is intended to
include electronic mail companies.67 The ECPA also comprises
the Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional Records Access Act,6" which establishes broad prohibitions6 9 on
accessing and disclosing electronically-stored communications.
The ECPA has three exceptions, however, that may limit its
protection of employee E-mail: non-interstate systems, prior consent, and business use.
1. Interstate Systems
In the first place, the ECPA may only protect messages sent
over public networks such as MCI Mail, Internet, Prodigy, or
CompuServe. This is because the definition of "electronic communications" under the statute only pertains to such communication
that "affects interstate or foreign commerce."70 Intracompany Email systems may not be covered by the ECPA. Although Congress did intend for the ECPA to include intracompany networks,
it confined this broader coverage to "wire communication," and
Congress has specified that "wire communication" includes some
element of the human voice.7 Thus, a company voice mail (PBX)

65. Id. at 3568. The ECPA defines electronic communications as the "transfer of
signs, signals, writings, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or
photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce. ..." 18 U.S.C.
§2510(12) (Supp. 1994). The legislative history further clarifies that the term "also
includes electronic mail, digitized transmissions, and video teleconferences." S.
REP. NO. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555,
3568.
66. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (Supp. 1994).
67. S. REP. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3568.
68. 18 U.S.C. § 2701-2711 (Supp. 1994).
69. Id. § 2701. This provision makes it unlawful for anyone who "(1) intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided; or (2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access
that facility; and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents unauthorized access to a wire
or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in such system. . ..
Id. The Act does not specifically state that electronic storage pertains to E-mail,
but this provision would still protect E-mail provided as an "electronic communication service." Id. § 2702(a)(1).
70. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (Supp. 1994).
71. Id. § 2510(18); S. REP. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1986), reprinted in
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may be covered, but not an intracompany E-mail system-unless
that system crosses state lines or perhaps connects to an interstate network. The ECPA is not at all clear on this point, however, and thus court interpretation will be needed.
2. PriorConsent
The ECPA also allows the interception of electronic communications where "one of the parties to the communication has given
prior consent."72 Unless other parties with whom an employee is
communicating allow the employer access to the messages, the
employee would appear protected, assuming he or she did not give
consent. But the analysis may then turn on whether or not some
aspect of the employer-employee relationship might be construed
to suggest that implied consent was given. Courts have found that
consent may be inferred from "surrounding circumstances indicating that the [parties] agreed to the surveillance. ""
The courts do not construe the meaning of implied consent
broadly, however. In Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 7" an appeals
court determined that a telemarketing employee's knowledge of
her employer's capability of monitoring her private telephone
conversations could not be considered implied consent to such
monitoring.75 Yet the court in this case did find that Watkins
had consented to a company policy of monitoring business calls
that could include the unintentional interception of a personal call

1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3568. This states that "the transmission of 'communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce,' are within the definition of a 'Wire
communication.' This language recognizes that private networks and intracompany
communications systems are common today and brings them within the protection
of the statute." S. REP. No. 541, at 11-12. "[Tlhe term 'wire communication' means
the transfer of a communication which includes the human voice at some point."
Congress considers voice mail to be an example of "wire communication." Id. at 12.
Congress does not explicitly include private networks and intracompany communications within its discussion of electronic communications. What is confusing about
this distinction, however, is that the definition of "wire communication" in the Act
"includes any electronic storage of such communication." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (Supp.
1994).
72. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (Supp. 1994) The Stored Wire and Electronic Communications provisions also permit access to stored communications with the authorization "by the user of that service with respect to a communication of or intended
for that user;. . . ." Id. § 2701(c)(2)
73. Griggs-Ryan v. Smith 904 F.2d 112, 117 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting United
States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 378 (2d Cir. 1987)). The court further stated that
"consent inheres where a person's behavior manifests acquiescence or a comparable
voluntary diminution of his or her otherwise protected rights." Griggs-Ryan, 940
F.2d at 116. This case was outside the employment context, although it concerned
telephone monitoring.
74. 704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983).
75. Id. at 581.
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for a limited time. 8 The court stated that the prior consent exception (of then Title III) does not give employers carte blanche
monitoring rights, but can be used to justify monitoring business
calls including the momentary interception of a personal call until
the personal nature is established." Thus, monitoring of business communications and the inadvertent monitoring of personal
communications could be allowed if an employer has a written
policy addressing E-mail monitoring. In this case, employees using
the system would be considered to have given implied consent.
Yet it should be noted that implied consent would not be
found if the monitoring exceeded the terms of the company's policy.78 In other words, if the monitoring policy was designed to survey only the extent of E-mail use in the company, for example,
then uncovering a breach of trade secrets may be beyond the
scope of implied consent. Moreover, implied consent would not be
found if an employer only suggests to the employees that monitoring may be done. This was the scenario in a recent telephone case
where, from a telephone extension, owners of a liquor store recorded conversations of an employee suspected in an unsolved
burglary of the store. In Deal v. Spears," Newell Spears advised
his employee-who had been making numerous personal telephone calls-that he might be forced to monitor her calls if abuse
of the store's telephone for personal calls continued. 0 The court
held that the employee's consent was not implied because she was
not informed that she was being monitored, only that "they might
do so in order to cut down on personal calls."" Other courts also
hold there is an absence of implied consent where defendants
argue that a plaintiff simply "should have known" that he or she
was being monitored.82 Thus, the legality of E-mail monitoring
under the prior consent exception may depend on the specificity
and clarity of the company's monitoring policy.
3. Business Use Exception

Perhaps most troubling for employees are provisions
that-regardless of prior consent-might exclude from coverage
76. Id.
77. Id. at 581-82.
78. This was the case in Watkins, where a personal call was more than inadvertently monitored. Watkins, 704 F.2d at 582. The court remanded the case to determine the scope of the consent and to decide whether and to what extent the interception exceeded the consent. Id.
79. 980 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1992).
80. Id. at 1156-57.
81. Id. at 1157.
82. Campiti v. Walonis, 611 F.2d 387, 396 (1979) (finding that there was no implied consent when a police officer used an extension phone to intercept inmates'
telephone conversations).
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certain types of interceptions made in the "ordinary course of
business." There are two key provisions of the ECPA that address
this type of exception. One provision has been relied on in tele-

phone extension monitoring cases,"3 but may not pertain to Email monitoring unless telephone equipment or facilities are specifically involved. This provision essentially permits interceptions
where telephone or telegraph equipment are used in the ordinary
course of business.84 Yet courts may not consider a network
manager's modem, computer, or software program to be telephone
or telegraph equipment, and the leasing of telephone lines may
not necessarily qualify under this exemption. Even in telephone
extension cases, the telephone equipment distinction has been
narrowly construed. s5
Still, employers may turn to another ECPA "business use"
exception that does not specify the type of equipment, but rather
allows certain interceptions by electronic communication service
providers or their "agents." The section provides:
[i]t shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an officer, employee, or agent of a provider of wire or electronic communication service, whose facilities are used in the transmission of a wire communication, to intercept, disclose, or use that communication in the
normal course of his employment while engaged in any activity
which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his service or to the
protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service
86

83. See, e.g., Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1992) (applying a provision
of the ECPA in a telephone monitoring case); Epps v. St. Mary's Hosp. of Athens,
Inc., 802 F.2d 412 (11th Cir. 1986) (same); Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d
577 (11th Cir. 1983) (same).
84. The ECPA finds interceptions of electronic communications to be unlawful if
accomplished through the use of an "electronic, mechanical, or other device." 18
U.S.C. § 2510(4) (Supp. 1994). But such devices do not include:
a) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or any component thereof, (i) furnished to the subscriber or user by a provider of a wire
or electronic communication service in the ordinary course of its business
and being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its business or furnished by such subscriber or user for connection to the facilities of
such service and is used in the ordinary course of its business; or (ii) being
used by a provider of wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary course of its business ....

Id. § 2510(5)(a).
85. For example, in Epps v. St. Mary's Hosp., the court, in determining the
exceptions under § 2510, distinguished a "ringdown line" from an entire extension
telephone, and distinguished recording equipment used from the intercepting dispatch panel. 802 F.2d 412 (11th Cir. 1986). In Deal v. Spears, the court distinguished the use of a telephone recording device purchased from Radio Shack to fall
outside the exception since the device was not provided by a telephone company.
908 F.2d 1153, 1158 (8th Cir. 1992).
86. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(23)(a)(i) (Supp. 1994).
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The term "provider" would likely include public E-mail networks, such as Prodigy and CompuServe, and the term "agent"
may or may not be defined to include employers who subscribe to
or use their E-mail service. Companies with their own E-mail
systems on their own wide area (interstate) networks could also
fall under this exception as electronic communication service providers.87
It is the second element of both ECPA provisions-the "business use" exception-which may then be interpreted to give employers fairly broad authority to intercept and monitor E-mail
messages. Of course, the law would require employers and public
E-mail providers to demonstrate that a particular interception
was done in the ordinary course of business-such as the rendering of service maintenance. In fact, under the section quoted
above, service providers or employers would need to prove that
the monitoring was necessary to render service or to protect their
rights or property. Still, the courts may find that this includes
such reasons as the need to prevent abuses of the system such as
computer crime, system failure, or unpermitted personal use."
In cases involving telephone extension monitoring, the courts
have been fairly liberal in their interpretation of the business use
exception. In James v. Newspaper Agency Corp.,89 the court held
that a newspaper's telephone monitoring program of its telemarketing employees was squarely within the business (telephone)
extension exception because it was conducted for a "legitimate
business purpose" designed to help employees deal with the public
effectively." In Briggs v. American Air Filter Co.," where a supervisor monitored a business call where an employee divulged
trade secrets to a competitor, the court held that the monitoring
was within the ordinary course of business.2
Some courts have nonetheless limited the business use exception according to the scope of the intrusion and the nature of the

87. One confusing aspect is that the service provider must be using facilities for
the transmission of a wire communication, which by definition, may limit this to
only providers that also transport voice communications. See supra note 69 for the
text of the section that makes it unlawful to access a facility through which an
electronic communication service is provided unless authorization is given.
88. Section 2511(2)(a)(i) does not further limit the extent of monitoring by
electronic communication service providers. Instead, it states only that "a provider
of wire communication service to the public shall not utilize service observing or
random monitoring except for mechanical or service quality control checks." 18
U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (emphasis added).
89. 591 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1979).
90. Id. at 581.
91. 455 F. Supp. 179 (N.D. Ga. 1978), affd, 630 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1980).
92. Id. at 181-82.
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communication. For example, in Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co.,"
where the interception was of a personal call, the court followed
Briggs, but said it would only allow the unintentional interception
of a personal call, and for only a limited time until the personal
nature of the call is established." In Deal v. Spears,5 the court
found that the employer had exceeded the scope of the exception
by having listened to all 22 hours of his employee's tape recorded
personal calls. Even though the court agreed that the employer
had a "legitimate business reason" for listening (i.e., employee's
suspected burglary involvement and abuse of phone privileges),
the court agreed with the Watkins court in concluding that the
employer might have legitimately monitored the calls only to the
extent necessary to determine that they were personal and in
violation of store policy."
Thus, if the courts analogize E-mail interceptions to telephone extension monitoring, employers may be able to prove a
legitimate business reason for the monitoring, provided that the
monitoring does not include reading personal E-mail in its entirety. Of course, personal E-mail would still be vulnerable to some
degree of observation, and unless the contents of the messages are
divulged or clearly acted upon, it may be difficult to prove that intercepted personal messages were completely read. Even Congress
acknowledges that computer monitoring may be more difficult to
limit than telephone conversations.97
In addition to the prohibitions on interception, it should also
be noted that the ECPA further prohibits the intentional disclosure of the contents of an electronic communication obtained
through an illegal interception." This would include any information concerning the "substance, purport, or meaning" of the
communication. 9 In Deal v. Spears, where one of the liquor store

93. 704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983).
94. Id. at 581-82.
95. 980 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1992).
96. Id. at 1158. The court did, however, refuse to grant punitive damages, considering that the employee was warned, that the employer had a purpose to solve a
crime, that the employer had asked a law enforcement officer in advance about the
legality of recording, and that the tapes were only played to the employee. Id. at
1159.
97. "It is impossible to 'listen' to a computer and determine when to stop listening and minimize as it is possible to do in listening to a telephone conversation." S.
REP. No. 541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1986) reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555,
3568. This would "require a somewhat different procedure than that used to minimize a telephone call." Id. at 3583.
98. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c). This attaches liability when a party "intentionally
discloses ... to any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained"
through an interception illegal under the Act. Id.
99. Id. § 2510(8).
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owners had disclosed only the general nature of the taped contents to the plaintiffs' spouses, the disclosure fell within the statute's purview.0 0 Thus, if an employee is successful in showing
that an E-mail interception was in violation of the Act, he or she
may also then recover damages 1 ' if the employer showed or
even discussed the contents of a message with others.
Finally, for government employees and employees subject to
government interceptions of their E-mail, the ECPA does provide
greater relief by requiring that a warrant be issued first.0" If a
warrant is issued, however, providers would be required to disclose the contents of an electronic communication in electronic
storage. Not all personal communications beyond the application
of the search warrant may be "seized" and read, however. This
proposition was recently tested in a March 1993 case where a
judge ruled that Secret Service agents had indeed violated the
ECPA when they read (and destroyed) additional stored electronic
E-mail-on computers they had
messages-including personal
0 3
seized with a warrant.

B. State Statutes
Most states also have statutes that limit the interception of
electronic communications, and states are also free to enact laws
that are more restrictive and thus provide even greater privacy
protections than the federal law. Unless a conflict between the
laws exists, the state law will prevail." 4
Many states have laws that, in fact, incorporate the provisions of the ECPA, including the "prior consent" and "business
use" exceptions. 105 Yet several states also require the prior con-

100. Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d at 1156, 1158 (8th Cir. 1992).
101. Under any of these sections of the ECPA, a successful civil plaintiff may recover the greater of either A) actual damages plus any profits made by the violator,
or B) the greater of $100 a day for each day of violation or $10,000. 18 U.S.C. §
2520(c)(2)(A), (B) (Supp. 1994). Punitive damages, attorney fees, and other litigation costs reasonably incurred are also allowed. Id. § 2520(b)(2), (3).

102. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (Supp. 1994).
103. The computers belonged to an individual suspected of a computer crime conspiracy to disrupt 911 systems. Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret
Service, 816 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Tex. 1993). The court held that the Secret Service
had violated provisions of the Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and
Transactional Records Access Act (of the ECPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711. Steve
Jackson Games, Inc., 816 F. Supp. at 443.
104. Federal law does not pre-empt state law under the Supremacy Clause of the
U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Ann K. Bradley, An Employer's Perspective on Monitoring Telemarketing Calls: Invasion of Privacy or Legitimate Business Practice?,42
LAB. L.J. 259 (May 1991).
105. See infra Table 2.
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sent of "all parties"" which could severely limit employee Email monitoring if the consent of the party with whom an employee is communicating must also give his or her consent."°7 Many
states also only exempt communications common carriers under
their business use exceptions, rather than "electronic communica-

tion service" providers."8 The term "common carrier" could arguably preclude from these exceptions any service providers such as
Prodigy, CompuServe, and value-added carriers that are not identified and regulated as "common carriers. ""9° In this sense, em-

ployees in a few states may find greater protection from monitoring under state law."'
Yet in other states there are no similar wiretap provisions

that may protect employees,"' and in one state, Nebraska, employers are specifically exempted under that state's wiretapping
provision. Nebraska, which supports many telemarketing firms

and has a fairly liberal telecommunications regulatory environment, permits "an employer on his, her, or its business premises ... to intercept, disclose, or use" an electronic communication
while "in the normal course of his, her, or its employment... .." 2 The law limits the monitoring, but does permit the
monitoring for "performance control checks as long as reasonable
notice of the policy of random monitoring is provided to their

106. Id.
107. Unless, of course, the other party is also an employee of the same company
and "implied consent" is found.
108. See infra Table 2.
109. A communications common carrier provides transmission service facilities to
the general public-such as a telephone or telegraph company-and is regulated by
federal and state regulatory agencies. See, e.g., W. JOHN BLYTH & MARY M. BLYTH,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS: CONCEPTS, DEVELOPMENTS, AND MANAGEMENT 329 (2d ed.
1990).
110. It should be noted that while many states limit the business use exemption,
employees may still lose protection where prior consent is found.
111. See infra Table 2 for those states not listed or that do not clearly identify a
business use exemption (Prior Consent Exemption Only).
112. NEB. REV. STAT. § 86-702(2)(a) (1992). This specifically states:
It shall not be unlawful ... for an employer on his, her, or its business premises, for an operator of a switchboard, or for an officer, employee, or agent
of any provider, the facilities of which are used in the transmission of a wire
communication, to intercept, disclose, or use that communication in the
normal course of his, her, or its employment while engaged in an activity
which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his, her, or its service or to
the protection of the rights or property of the carrier or provider of such
communication services. Such employers and providers shall not utilize
service observing or random monitoring except for mechanical, service quality, or performance control checks as long as reasonable notice of the policy of
random monitoring is provided to their employees.
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employees.""'
A few states have considered stricter laws that would specifically constrain the monitoring practices of private sector employees, 14 although many of these measures have generally been defeated by corporate lobbyists. 1 5 A law was proposed in Texas,
that did not pass, which would have protected privacy by prohibiting secret electronic surveillance and unreasonable searches, and
by preventing employers from obtaining unnecessary private information about employees."' California recently attempted to
pass a law to specifically prohibit telephone companies from monitoring or recording their employees' conversations, but the bill
was vetoed by the Governor." 7 Other states have passed laws
that restrict surveillance, but do not necessarily protect E-mail or
computer files."'
One of the most comprehensive pieces of legislation currently
proposed is in Massachusetts. Earlier bills"' did not pass or
were struck down as being overly broad,120 but a new bill has
been introduced in 1994.21 It essentially provides that employers can only monitor their employees if they give written
notice about the electronic monitoring. In addition, the Massachusetts bill requires employers to inform the monitored employees of the frequency of surveillance, the type of data to be collected, and how the employer will use the monitoring. Georgia has
also introduced legislation this year to provide restrictions on
electronic monitoring by employers,"2 and New York introduced
a bill that would prohibit employers from operating electronic
monitoring and/or surveillance equipment for observing "non-work

113. Id.
114. See Dworkin, supra note 31, at 80.
115. Casarez, supra note 17, at 38.
116. Dworkin, supra note 31, at 80.
117. 1993 CA A.B. 2271 (vetoed Oct. 11, 1993). The law would have prohibited
"any officer, employee, or agent of a telephone corporation from monitoring, recording, wiretapping, eavesdropping, or otherwise documenting any conversation of its
employees, except ... a telephone corporation may monitor telephone conversations of its employees solely for the purposes of quality assurance and training."

118. For example, Nevada passed a law that prohibits surreptitious monitoring
of other people, but it is limited to private conversations. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
200.650 (Michie 1991). Connecticut passed a law that prevents electronic surveillance of areas provided for the "health or personal comfort of employees or for the
safeguarding of their possessions." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-48b(b) (West 1987).

Although the state law does not specify E-mail, it is considered to apply to the surveillance of related areas such as lounges, locker rooms, and rest areas, and it does
not consider prior notification as an exception. Dworkin, supra note 31, at 80.
119. Such as 1991 MA H.B. 4457.
120. Opinion of the Justices, 358 Mass. 827, 260 N.E. 740 (1970).

121. 1994 MA H.B. 1800. As of June 1994, the bill had not passed the House.
122. 1994 GA S.B. 646 (introduced Feb. 15, 1994).
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related activities."12 No other bills addressing electronic monitoring are currently pending in any other state. Currently, private
sector employees in most states may generally be left unprotected
under state law.
IV. COMMON LAW AND E-MAIL INTRUSION
In the absence of clear statutory or constitutional rights to Email privacy, employees may be able to find relief in a common
law cause of action known generally as "invasion of privacy.1 4
This common law cause of action has been fairly recently recognized by courts and legislative bodies as a means of protecting
against unwarranted intrusions into one's affairs; essentially, one
who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to liability
for the resulting harm to the interests of the other. Some states
recognize a common law right of privacy which may protect private employees.1 25 This section discusses the tort of intrusion
into seclusion, the tort's elements, and some of the conditions
courts have adopted as criteria in deciding a case involving an
intrusion into seclusion.
Of four generally recognized privacy torts, 26 the specific
tort known as "intrusion into seclusion or private affairs" would
be the most applicable to the interests of E-mail users. This tort
provides that "one who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his or her private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his or her privacy, if the intrusion would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person." 27 This right of privacy would
arguably include the right to be free from unreasonable intrusions
by employer searches.2 8

123. 1994 NY A.B. 10705 (introduced April 1, 1994). This may apply to personal
E-mail messages if considered to be "non-work related activities."
124. Privacy law began as a common law tort that grew from a set of rights
broadened to mean "the right to enjoy life-the right to be let alone." See Samuel
D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 192, 192
(1890).
125. 2 PRIVACY LAW AND PRACTICE 9.02[3] (George B. Trubow, ed., 1987).
126. In 1960, Dean William L. Prosser synthesized hundreds of cases recognizing
a right of privacy actionable in tort. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 28 CALIF. L. REV.
383 (1960). His widely accepted analysis (reflected in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652B (1977)) breaks down the privacy invasion lawsuit into four separate
torts: 1) Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiffs name or
likeness, 2) Publicity, which places a person in a false light in the public eye, 3)
Public disclosure of embarrassing, private facts about the plaintiff, and 4) Intrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
128. 2 PRIVACY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 125 (citing Love v. Southern Bell
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Until 1979, however, few employees brought suits against
their employers. 29 Since then, there has been a dramatic upsurge in privacy litigation.13 1 In general, employee privacy suits
under common law have concerned such matters as drug testing3'T and polygraph testing,132 where the courts appear to be
supportive of employers' attempts to create a safe working environment.1 3 Other types of employee privacy suits have concerned the photographing of employees,3 where courts have
generally allowed employers to photograph their employees over
the employees' objections when the employer has shown a legitimate purpose for taking the pictures. 3 '
Although the courts do not specifically rule according to any
list of criteria, several factors have evolved for use in determining
a common law right against intrusion. Courts tend to consider: 1)
whether there was an intentional intrusion; 36 2) the location
and private nature of the activity involved; 37 3) whether the in-

Tel. and Tel. Co., 263 So. 2d 460 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 266 So. 2d 429 (La.
1972)).
129. See David F. Linowes & Ray C. Spencer, Privacy: The Workplace Issue of the
'90s, 23 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 591 (1990) (discussing the history of suits brought by
employees for invasion of privacy).
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling Inc., P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989)
(where employer testing for drug use was found not actionable as an invasion of
privacy because the intrusion was not unwarranted), second appeal, 834 P.2d 1220.
132. See, e.g., Ballaron v. Equitable Shipyards, Inc., 521 So. 2d 481 (La. Ct. App.
1988), cert. denied, 522 So. 2d 571 (La. 1988); Gibson v. Hummel, 688 S.W.2d 4
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (requiring a polygraph test did not constitute outrageous conduct where employee admitted to stealing during the test).
133. 62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 61 (1990).
134. See, e.g., Thomas v. General Elec. Co., 207 F. Supp. 792 (W.D. Ky. 1962)
(holding that the employer could take motion pictures of employees without their
consent for purposes of studies to increase efficiency and promote the safety of employees).
135. 62A AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 133.
136. This would include surreptitious surveillance such as wiretapping or eavesdropping. See, e.g., Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971); see also
Marks v. Bell Tel. Co., 460 Pa. 73, 331 A.2d 424 (Pa. 1975) (where, in the absence
of an intentional overhearing of a private conversation by an unauthorized party,
the tort of invasion of privacy was not committed).
137. For example, courts have applied a different standard to privacy in the
home and in similar quarters. See, e.g., Byfield v. Candler, 125 S.E. 905, 906 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1924) (intrusions into overnight quarters on a train or ship by management); Newcomb Hotel v. Corbett, 108 S.E. 309, 309-10 (Ga. Ct. App. 1921) (intrusions into guest rooms by hotel management). Yet if individuals are in a public
place, there may be no cause of action. See Muratore v. MIS Scotia Prince, 656 F.
Supp. 471, 482 (D.C. Me. 1988) (photographing passenger in a public place). Even
if the plaintiff is considered to be in a public place, however, some consideration is
given to the private nature of the activity. For example, in Lewis v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 339 N.W.2d 857 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983), the court considered the private
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trusion was "highly offensive to the reasonable person;"'38 and 4)
whether the infringer had a legitimate purpose warranting the

intrusion.'39
The first condition may not be difficult to meet, although it
should be noted that any unintentional access to an E-mail message by a system administrator during system maintenance, for

example, would certainly defeat an employee's privacy claim. In
terms of the location and private nature involved, company lawyers may successfully argue that E-mail at the work location is
within the work context and should not be deemed private as
such. Moreover, an employee may have difficulty proving that any

private communication was actually read. ""
The last two factors that have been considered by courts
present greater difficulty for employees. For example, an employee
would have to convince the court that the employer's intrusion
was "highly offensive" to a reasonable person. Courts may not

consider the accessing and reading of employee E-mail to be "highly offensive," particularly if a court finds that the employee had
no expectation of privacy in his or her E-mail."' Yet the courts
may compare the use of a personal computer E-mail password to

nature of one's activity in a case involving the observations of a store patron trying
on clothes in a dressing room-despite the fact that the activity occurred on store
property. In general, that which is intruded upon must be entitled to be private.
WILLIAM L. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 855 (5th ed. 1984).

138. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 127, § 652B cmt d (stating that an intrusion
must be "highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable man" which explicitly requires
this criterion. Courts may also take into account the nature of the intrusion, such
as whether it "was done in a vicious and malicious manner not reasonably limited
and designed to obtain the information needed

..

. " and was "calculated to fright-

en and torment... ." Pinkerton Nat'l Detective Agency, Inc. v. Stevens, 122 S.E.2d
119, 123 (Ga. Ct. App. 1963). Some courts have applied or recognized an even more
stringent requirement of "outrageous conduct," where the conduct must be so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds
of decency and be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. RESTATEMENT, supra note 127.

139. See, e.g., Horstman v. Newman, 291 S.W.2d 567 (Ky. Ct. App. 1956) (per
curiam) (landlord may enter tenant's land to demand rent due); Engman v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 631 S.W.2d 98 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (telephone company may
enter home of individual who had not paid the phone bill, in order to remove the
company's phones); Schmukler v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 116 N.E.2d 819 (Ohio C.P.
1953) (holding that there was no invasion of privacy where telephone company
monitored residential phone after discovering the number of calls to be excessively
high, where the monitoring was for a short period of time and was done for business purposes).
140. See Marks v. Bell Tel. Co., 331 A.2d 424, 431 (Pa. 1975) (finding even
though the police department recorded all of the plaintiff's incoming telephone
calls, the plaintiff could not recover without proving that some private conversation
was either heard or replayed).
141. For an analysis of how courts might consider an expectation of privacy relative to company E-mail, see supra 45-53 and accompanying text.
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the use of a padlock on a locker, as in K-Mart Corp. v. Trotti,'"
where a Texas court found that an employer unreasonably intruded on an employee's privacy when the employee's co-workers
searched her locker which was secured with her own lock. 43 The
courts may also find an employee E-mail search to be unreasonable if no advance notification was given, or a union official was
not present.1 1 Still, the courts may consider the offensiveness of
the intrusion in light of the legitimate purpose criterion."' For
example, in Oliver v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co.,14 the

court found that the "highly offensive" standard was not met
where the employer monitored telephone conversations for the
purposes of evaluating performance and whether or not an employee was disclosing documents to a competitor. 147 For this reason, a common law decision may ultimately hinge on a finding of
a legitimate business purpose. As with the ECPA exceptions, an
employer may easily satisfy this criterion by producing reasons for
the interceptions that a court may find persuasive-such as the
need to assess performance, protect against theft, 141 search for
violations in disclosing trade secrets, 49 obtain information in a

142. 677 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984), writ of error denied, 686 S.W.2d 593

(Tex. 1985).
143. 677 S.W.2d at 637. The court held that "the element of a highly offensive
intrusion is a fundamental part of the definition of an invasion of privacy." Id.
144. See, e.g., International Nickel Co., 50 Lab. Arb. 65 (Shister 1967) (finding
that when a company opened and searched the locker of an employee, there was no
invasion of privacy because the company had a justified reason for opening the
locker and there was a union representative present when the company opened the
locker); B.F. Goodrich v. United Ass'n of Journeyman and Apprentices, Local 195,
70 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 326 (1978) (Oppenheim, Arb.); see also 2 PRIVACY LAW AND
PRACTICE, supra note 125, 9.02[3] (citing the above cases).
145. Although it is argued that the purpose factor is too often merged with the
question of outrageousness or offensiveness. See 1 PRIVACY LAW AND PRACTICE
1.06 (George B. Trubow, ed., 1986).
146. 632 P.2d 1295 (Or. Ct. App. 1981).
147. See also Froelich v. Werbin, 509 P.2d 1118 (Kan. 1968); second appeal,
Froelich v. Adair, 516 P.2d 993 (Kan. 1973); third appeal, Froelich v. Werbin, 548
P.2d 482 (Kan. 1976), where the Kansas Supreme Court considered an intrusion to
be offensive when a hospital orderly collected a hair sample from a patient's hairbrush for the purpose of establishing the patient's homosexuality. The dissenting
opinion stated that the purpose of the intrusion was irrelevant. 516 P.2d at 998.
148. A search for stolen property by an employer has also been held not to be an
unreasonable invasion of privacy. See 2 PRIVACY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note
125,
9.02[3] (citing Cherkin v. Bellevue Hosp. Ctr., 479 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y.
1979)). Cf K-Mart Corp. v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984), writ of
error denied, 686 S.W.2d (Tex. 1985) (holding that mere suspicion that an employee
stole merchandise was insufficient to justify a search of the employee's locker without consent).
149. For a case where there was wiretapping by a company in order to determine
whether an employee was disclosing confidential company information, see Oliver
v. Pacific N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 632 P.2d 1295 (Or. Ct. App. 1981).
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business emergency, or simply promote efficiency.'
There are other factors that may also affect recovery, such as
whether or not the employee must show anguish and suffering as
a result of the privacy invasion.' The courts may also consider
whether or not the employee consented (explicitly or implicitly) to
the monitoring," 2 and whether or not the search was in accordance with an announced inspection policy.' 53 In addition, a de-

cision may turn on an analysis of common law privilege. Here, a
court may find that within the employer-employee relationship,
certain communications constitute a conditional privilege, possibly
giving an employer justification in examining E-mail messages as
information that affects a sufficiently important interest of the
company. 54 Courts have not expressly adopted common law privileges in "intrusion upon seclusion" actions, but such an analysis
may occur. 5
Finally, in applying various criteria, the courts may specifically analogize employee E-mail intrusions under common law to
common law actions associated with the opening of personal mail,
eavesdropping, and recording of conversations. 5 ' Few cases appear to exist that address a common law cause of action associat-

150. See, e.g., Thomas v. General Elec. Co., 207 F. Supp. 792 (W.D. Ky. 1962)
(finding a legitimate business interest in photographing employees without their
consent for purposes of a study to increase efficiency). Note also that an employer
may defend its monitoring actions by citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENcy §§ 380-398 (1957), which indicates that an employee owes a duty of loyalty and
a duty to act with reasonable skill and care to the employer.
151. See, e.g., Hoth v. American States Ins. Co., 735 F. Supp. 290, 292 (N.D. Ill.
1990) (finding that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action in Illinois for invasion of privacy where an employer searched his desk and file cabinets because the
employee suffered no anguish and did not allege that the employer lacked authority to conduct the search).
152. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 137, at 867.
153. 2 PRIVACY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 125 (citing Cherkin v. Bellevue
Hosp. Ctr., 479 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), where a court held that an employer
may search an employee's purse in accordance with an announced inspection policy).
154. See Senogles v. Security Ben. Life Ins. Co., 536 P.2d 1358 (Kan. 1975) (holding that an insurance claimant consented to a reasonable investigation upon filing
an injury claim, and therefore, there existed a privileged relationship between the
claimant and the investigators).
155. 1 PRIVACY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 145,
1.06(5].
156. Courts may also compare E-mail to a locker or desk drawer. For a case
which involved an employer having searched an employee's locker, see K-Mart
Corp. v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984), writ of error denied, 686 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1985). It is also possible that an E-mail message may be likened to a
bulletin-board notice, in which case protection would not likely be found. Note that
because telephone eavesdropping and wiretapping cases are generally subject to
constitutional and statutory law, courts do not often apply common law to these
cases.
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ed with privacy and the mail. Yet, in Vernars v. Young, 57 a tort
law claim of invasion of privacy was considered valid where a
corporate officer opened and read a fellow corporate employee's
mail which was delivered to the corporation's office and marked
personal. This case suggested that a reasonable expectation of
privacy under common law may exist in one's mail.158 Other related cases involving eavesdropping and recordings, however,
reveal only little relief for employees, since a legitimate business
purpose often prevails.'59 The courts may nonetheless take into
account whether or not the intercepted communications were
subsequently disclosed and whether the employer instigated the
action. In Beard v. Akzona, Inc.,160 for example, a secretary was
fired after her husband, also an employee, turned over to their
employer telephone tape recordings of her conversations with a
fellow employee with whom she was having an affair. No invasion
of privacy was established because the tapes were not heard by
anyone other than the employer's managerial staff, and the employer did not instigate the deception. In this sense, a court may
find no invasion of privacy with E-mail if a network manager, on
his or her own initiative, turns E-mail files over to corporate management, and the contents of the messages are not publicly disclosed.
To date, no court has considered whether E-mail interception
constitutes an unreasonable, offensive intrusion into the private
affairs of workers.' The few cases that exist concerning E-mail
searches have been brought under suits of wrongful termination
(resulting from the employer having read the mail)," 2 ECPA

157. 539 F.2d 966 (3d Cir. 1976).

158. The Young court cited a telephone wiretapping case, Marks v. Bell Tel. Co.,
331 A.2d 424 (Pa. 1975), commenting that "[jiust as private individuals have a

right to expect that their telephonic communications will not be monitored, they
also have a reasonable expectation that their personal mail will not be opened and
read by unauthorized persons." Vernars v. Young, 539 F.2d at 969. In Marks, however, privacy rights were not considered infringed because no private conversation
was intentionally overheard. 331 A.2d at 424.
159. See, e.g., Schmukler v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 116 N.E.2d 819 (C.P. 1953) (holding that there was no actionable invasion of privacy where a telephone company
monitored a residential phone after discovering that there was an excessively high
number of calls being made, where the monitoring was done for a short time and
was for business purposes only).
160. 517 F. Supp. 128 (E.D. Tenn. 1981).
161. Casarez, supra note 17, at 37.
162. See Dean, supra note 8, at 11 which mentions a case whereby Nissan Motor
Company was sued because it allegedly fired a pair of employees after reading
their personal E-mail messages on the company's system. A California court rejected the privacy claim in Bourke v. Nissan Motor Corp., No YC 003979, slip op. (D.C.
Cal. 1993). See also Michael Furey et al., Overview: More Whistleblowers?, NEW
JERSEY L.J., Apr. 11, 1994, at 4.
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or passing trade secrets."" These cases have large-

ly been thrown out, settled out of court, or are still pending. Thus,
while the courts have generally tolerated the surveillance of employees, at least where a legitimate business interest is found, the
courts are uncertain as to how they will treat and balance employer and employee interests relative to E-mail searches.
V. PENDING LEGISLATION
This section briefly discusses two bills that have been introduced in Congress to address E-mail and other forms of electronic
monitoring of employees. Legislation was first proposed several
years ago when the complaints of workers from airline reservation
agents, secretaries, telephone operators, and a broad range of
blue-collar America first registered in Washington, D.C. But only
recently have the bills caught the interest of lawmakers and the
White House.6 5
The Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act, sponsored by
Senator Paul Simon (D-Ill.), 66 and its companion bill in the
House,
were originally drafted to prevent telephone companies
and telemarketing firms from monitoring the telephone calls of
operators and telemarketers. They were later revised to curb
snooping on employees via video cameras. But recent revisions expand the scope of the legislation to cover all kinds of computer
communications, including E-mail and voice mail. 68
The proposed law would limit monitoring in several ways,
including the following: 1) employers would have to tell new em-

A wrongful-termination charge also applied to cases involving Alana Shoars,
formerly an E-mail administrator at Epson America, who was allegedly fired for
complaining about her boss reading the supposedly private E-mail of Epson employees. Shoars v. Epson Am., Inc., No. SWC 112749, slip op. (D.C. Cal. 1990). The
employee who Epson fired filed a class action suit, Flanagan v. Epson Am., Inc.,
No. BC 007036, slip op. (D.C. Cal. 1990), for invasion of privacy on behalf of a large
group of Epson employees who had their electronic mail read by management.
Both Epson cases were dismissed by lower courts, but are currently on appeal.
Piller, supra note 2, at 122.
163. See supra note 102 and accompanying text for a discussion of a case which
involved electronic mail and an ECPA violation.
164. See, e.g., Dean, supra note 8, at 11 (discussing a case where Borland International sued its former employee Eugene Wang for sending trade secrets on electronic mail to a competitor); Electronic Mail Raises Issues, supra note 17, at A-7
(mentioning a case where a computer software company called Mentor Graphics
sued two former employees for sending trade secrets to a competitor).
165. Blackman & Franklin, supra note 1, at 5.
166. S. 984, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 139 CONG. REC. E1077 (1993) (introduced by
Rep. Pat Williams (D-MT)).
167. H.R. 1900, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 139 CONG. REC. E1077 (1993) (introduced
by Rep. Pat Williams (D-MT)).
168. Brown, supra note 32, at 6.
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ployees how they might be monitored and how the collected data
would be used;' 2) employers would be required to give advance notice (day and hour) that monitoring will take place 7 °
(House version:' 7' notice not required to specify day/hour); 3)
The total time that an employee could be monitored would be
capped at two hours per week'72 (House version: unlimited during the first 60 days of employment, 40 times/month for first two
years, and 15 times/month thereafter),' and; 4) Periodic or random monitoring of long-term employees (over 5 years) would
be
75
prohibited'74 (House version: continues at 15 times/month).
The legislation also requires that notice be given to others
(non-employees) who may also be monitored 17 (which may pose
interesting difficulties in the case of E-mail addressees and senders). Employers may only collect and review data limited to an
employee's work, 177 and cannot intentionally engage in electronic
monitoring of an employee engaged in First Amendment
rights. 78 In addition, no action may be taken by the employer
based on any personal data that was illegally obtained. 79 The
legislation also does not require advance notice if an employer
suspects the employee is engaged in unlawful activity, willful
gross misconduct, or conduct that would have a "significant adverse effect" on the employer or other employees. 8 ° It allows employers to access information in case of "immediate business
needs."'' Finally, it provides exceptions for financial institutions, securities firms, the intelligence community, and gambling
facilities. 8 '
The proposed legislation has so far attracted many co-sponsors, but has also spurred considerable debate. The Department of
Labor, for instance, has not been in favor of the legislation, partly
because it considers the bills to contain too many unclear terms

169. S. 984, supra note 166, § 4(B).

170. Id. § 4(B)(3).
171. The House version underwent several modifications in early 1994 that are
reflected here. See, e.g., Section by Section Analysis of the Substitute Privacy for
Consumers and Workers Act (HR 1900), DAILY LAB. REP., Feb. 24, 1994, at d32.
172. S. 984, supra note 166, § 5(B)(2). New employees may be monitored for no
more than 60 days. Id. § 5(B)(1).
173. H.R. 1900, supra note 167, § 5.
174. S. 984, supra note 166, § 5(B)(3).

175. H.R. 1900, supra note 167, § 5.
176. S. 984, supra note 166, § 4(E).

177. Id. §§ 6(B), 10(A).
178. Id. § 10(C).

179. Id. § 8(a).
180. Id. § 5(C)(1).
181. Id. § 9(A).
182. Id. § 13(C).
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and overly broad definitions that pertain to management practices
in which personal employee data do not have relevance. 83 Others consider the bills to be unnecessarily burdensome for small
businesses and difficult to interpret and administer."M The telephone companies, including AT&T, are especially speaking out
against the measure." They are concerned about the impact of
the bills on E-mail management and usage. They argue that the
legislation could cripple the electronic messaging business. Thus,
with such opposition, the legislation may not just yet succeed in
providing relief for E-mail users.
Another bill introduced in Congress that has not gained as
much attention but is still under consideration is the Telephone
Privacy Act of 1993, introduced by Senator Dale Bumpers (Dl
" This bill would do essentially the opposite, making it
AR).
lawful to intercept an electronic communication where "such person is an employer or its agent engaged in lawful electronic monitoring of its employees' communications made in the course of the
87
The bill has not advanced, but its
employees' duties.""
introduction indicates that the matter is still open to debate and
may not be easily settled.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Current law thus appears to generally favor employers when
it comes to E-mail monitoring in the workplace. Constitutional
privacy rights only pertain to government interceptions, and federal statutory law does not appear to provide protection for interceptions within an intracompany system. Prior consent and business use exemptions of federal and state statutory laws may be
construed to permit monitoring. State laws specifically addressing
the E-mail issue are lacking, and a common law right of privacy
may not be found to protect employee E-mail interests. Unless the
courts provide a precise interpretation of the existing law in favor
of employee privacy interests, or adequate legislation is passed,
employees may be at the mercy of employers who take an active
role in browsing through their E-mail. In fact, more employers
may take advantage of this "new" opportunity once they under-

183. See Jennifer J. Laabs, Surveillance: Tool or Trap?, 71 PERSONNEL J. 96
(June 1992) (discussing the position that the Department of Labor has taken).
184. See, e.g., Pros, Cons of Privacy Bill Explored During Senate Hearing, Daily
Lab. Rep., (BNA) June 23, 1993 (quoting a top executive who testified at the Senate hearing that the bill would be hard on small companies, and the bill would be
difficult to interpret).
185. CWA Calls Monitoring 'Menace;' Bill Would Force Companies to Disclose
Monitoring Practices,COMM. DAILY, June 24, 1993, at 3.
186. S.311, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 139 CONG. REC. S1390 (1993).
187. Id. § 2 (proposing to amend 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d)).
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stand that it may not be unlawful.
Despite the fact that Congress is considering passing laws
which may help define what is acceptable monitoring in the
workplace, these laws are inadequate in prescribing what is permissible E-mail workplace monitoring. This section first analyzes
the bills which Congress is contemplating and asserts that these
bills are inadequate. This section then proposes federal legislation
with specific guidelines for employers as a solution which offers a
balanced approach to the problem of workplace monitoring.
A. Legislative Solutions
E-mail presents a difficult case for lawmakers because it falls
somewhere between a telephone call and a written correspondence. Some business people may feel comfortable with an employer's right to examine written material, but would not sanction
listening in on telephone conversations. Yet case law generally
permits telephone extension monitoring,' while mail is afforded
greater privacy protection." 9 While both employers and employees have valid concerns about E-mail privacy, striking a balance
may not be easy.
The answer may exist in adopting a legislative solution, but
only if the law is carefully crafted and clearly applicable to E-mail
and similar electronic storage systems. States may act now by
proposing laws aimed at placing restrictions on monitoring. But
because corporate communications cross state lines, a federal
policy should also be adopted to provide uniform protections.
The Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act,' currently
pending in Congress, addresses many of the concerns and uncertainties raised by the existing laws. As with the rulings under
common law, employers would have to steer clear of communications that are not work-related,' and could not act on any personal information that may be unintentionally encountered.'
The legislation requires advance notice, yet does not go so far as
to prevent surreptitious monitoring to uncover suspected miscon-

188. See supra notes 74-77, 97, 151-55 and accompanying text for discussions of
telephone extension monitoring.
189. See, e.g., Vernars v. Young, 539 F.2d 966 (3d Cir. 1976) (finding a cause of
action for invasion of privacy may be maintained if an unauthorized person opens
the mail of another). For a discussion of the Young case, see supra notes 156-57.
See also Annotation, Opening, Search, and Seizure of Mail, 61 A.L.R. 2d 1282
(1958 & Later Case Service 1984 & 1993) (analyzing the search and seizure of mail
under the U.S Constitution).
190. S. 984, supra note 166; H.R. 1900, supra note 167.
191. Id. §§ 6(B), 10(A).
192. Id. § 8(a).
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"
duct. 93
' Finally, it provides protections that would apply to all
operations, whether intrastate or interstate, and generally does
not allow for any waivers (i.e., consent) by employees of their
rights under the law."9 4
Unfortunately, the Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act
may also be too narrow in scope and may not adequately balance
the needs of both employers and employees. The specific restrictions that limit monitoring to only new employees and to specified
amounts of time or observations (i.e., forty times a month'95 ) are
too inflexible and do not take into account the type of business
operation. For example, allowing unrestricted monitoring of new
employees, within the first sixty days, and no monitoring of those
beyond five years of employment' may be too specific, not accounting for special needs or the privacy rights of new employees.
Moreover, monitoring of all employees for more than two hours
per week 9 7 may be justifiable and even necessary for polling
and survey research organizations and telemarketing firms, which
are not exempted under the legislation. Yet allowing college administrators the ability to monitor untenured faculty E-mail for
up to two hours per week would hardly seem acceptable.'
There is also no agreement so far between the House and
Senate bills as to whether or not employees must be given advance notice of a company's monitoring in general, or whether the
employees must be given the exact days and hours when the monitoring will take place. Some adequate compromise will need to be
achieved on this point. Precise notice may go too far in stripping
employers of the ability to access company computer files outside
of specified monitoring periods. The ability to manage and control
safety, quality, and efficiency could be negatively affected. Yet
having only a general company policy with vague monitoring
procedures may go too far in allowing employers the ability to

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
Bates,

Id. § 5(C)(1).
Id. § 12(d).
H.R. 1900, supra note 167, § 5.
S. 984, supra note 166, § 5(B)(1), (3).
Id. § 5(B)(2).
The accessibility of college faculty E-mail is already being scrutinized. Karl
U-M Takes Stand: E-mail is Private, ANN ARBOR NEWS, Jan. 12, 1994, at

B1, B3. Some government offices are declaring that government employee E-mail is
subject to the Freedom of Information Act and must be available to the public and
the press to the same extent as other government records. Id. Whether the E-mail
of employees of state-supported institutions must be available to the public is unclear. Id. The University of Michigan recently addressed this issue and maintained
that its E-mail is off-limits, arguing that the E-mail is not "owned" by a public
body. Id. Nevertheless, in response to requests by two newspapers, the university
released copies of messages exchanged during a computer conference of the school's
regents. Online, CHRONICLE HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 27, 1994, at A26.
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monitor employee E-mail anytime. In either case, the employer's
ability to monitor is sanctioned by eliminating the surreptitious
nature of the monitoring (and hence, the expectation of privacy)
with less regard given to the reasonableness of the intrusion and
the particular needs or circumstances involved.
Finally, the proposed legislation addressing "electronic monitoring" does not cover interceptions of electronic communications
as protected under the ECPA."9 Thus, if the ECPA is held to be
applicable to employee E-mail actions, then the accessing and
reading of E-mail files may fall outside of the proposed legislation.
Under the ECPA, the prior consent or business use exemptions
may pertain, and monitoring may be found permissible, at least
on an interstate basis.
Senator Bumpers' bill, the Telephone Privacy Act of 1993,2"
also goes too far in granting employers unlimited access, including
access to E-mail of a personal nature. While it can be argued that
private, personal discussions have no place in the office, this argument is unrealistic. The legislation is overly broad, ignoring any
privacy rights or interests of employees.
B. Proposed Guidelines
A federal monitoring law with very specific provisions may
never fully meet the needs of employee privacy while preserving
employer management needs. The type of federal policy that
should be adopted must be flexible and aimed at preventing unreasonable intrusions relative to varying types of business operations, organizational needs, and employee privacy needs. Guidelines must also be broad so that it may clearly apply to all forms
of similar surveillance and be able to accommodate future communications technologies.
Such a broad federal policy could require that monitoring be
"reasonable," requiring employers to: 1) have a "legitimate business purpose" for engaging in monitoring; 2) use the least intrusive means possible to achieve the business objective; 3) limit the
access, use, and disclosure to information reasonably meeting that
objective; and 4) provide reasonable notification of the monitoring
and its use. Instead of specifying forty service observations per
month, for example, the courts could be the ultimate arbiters in
defining the scope of "reasonableness" relative to different types
and degrees of intrusion for different industries and as technologies and conditions change over time.
The federal law could then promote the education of employers and employees on the issue and mandate the development of

199. S. 984, supra note 166, § 2(2)(C)(i).
200. S. 311, supra note 186.
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company monitoring policies which could then provide the particular specificity that may be needed, within the federal guidelines
on reasonableness. It is imperative that employers create a company policy that clearly spells out monitoring practices and employee privacy specific to that company's operation. Federal law
could require a company's electronic monitoring policy to accomplish several objectives, such as: 1) identify the acceptable reasons
for surveillance and the specific business purpose to be achieved;
2) explain the monitoring procedures which may and may not be
used; 3) contain limitations on what is collected and the use of the
information obtained, restricting it to its stated purpose, and
ensuring confidentiality; 4) provide for reasonable security measures to prevent unauthorized access; 5) allow only limited, authorized access, defining authorization and who may grant and be
granted authorization; 6) make clear to employees that the security of their E-mail, for example, is not guaranteed and that E-mail
may not be protected by privacy law; 7) establish employee usage
guidelines, such as whether or not the system may be used for
nonbusiness (personal) exchanges, when and to what extent; 8)
provide for penalties for policy violations by employers and employees; 9) make the policy available to all employees at the time
of being hired and periodically thereafter; 10) review the policy
periodically.
The restrictiveness of a company's E-mail policy will depend
on the specific work environment and the needs of both the company and the employees. The "reasonableness" of the policy will be
kept in check by federal law as well as market forces, whereby
restrictive policies may result in worker dissatisfaction, lower
productivity, and unfilled positions. E-mail administrators and
network managers should review the existing law and the proposed legislation with their corporate legal departments. Of
course, the best policy that a company could adopt may be to
avoid monitoring E-mail systems altogether, whether for the purpose of uncovering wrongdoing or for even accessing files for what
might otherwise seem to be legitimate purposes.2"'
In the meantime, employees should take an active role in
becoming more aware of the potential for monitoring and find out
whether or not a company E-mail monitoring policy exists. If one
is not available, employees should demand that a policy be created, they should be involved in its creation, and they should become familiar with it's provisions. Notwithstanding, employees
should always be discreet and assume that there is no privacy
with their E-mail. In general, employees should protect them-

201. Companies may also want to get a help kit designed to help companies
develop an E-mail policy. The kit is available from the Electronic Mail Association,
1555 Wilson Blvd., Suite 300, Arlington, VA 22209 (703) 875-8620.
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selves by limiting their use of the system to matters of company
operations, and as a rule, never send anything that one would not
send to a fax machine or on a postcard.
If both employers and employees take steps to protect themselves, even from unintentional intrusions, and federal and corporate policies are developed, some reasonable balance between
privacy needs and management needs may be reached. Currently,
there is a significant gap between employees' perceptions of Email privacy and the rights of employers to monitor messages.
Employees are either unaware of the possibility of monitoring or
believe it is illegal. Companies are also lax in responding to the
issue and in examining their management monitoring practices.
Given the rapid growth of electronic mail, it is likely that more
lawsuits will be filed over the issue of E-mail privacy. Company
monitoring policies, general public awareness, and a broad federal
law prohibiting unreasonable intrusions should be created to address this new workplace issue.
TABLE 1
STATE CONSTITUTIONS
EXPLICITLY RECOGNIZING A PRIVACY RIGHT
ALASKA:" 2 "The right of the people to privacy is recognized
and shall not be infringed upon."
ARIZONA: ° "No person shall be disturbed in his private
affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law."
CALIFORNIA: °4 "All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying
and defending life and liberty, acquiring safety, happiness, and
privacy."

FLORIDA:"' "Every natural person has the right to be free
from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided herein."
HAWAII: 2 ° "The right of the people to privacy is recognized

and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling
state interest. The legislature shall take affirmative steps to implement this right."
ILLINOIS: °7 "The people shall have the right to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and other possessions against

202. ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 22 (emphasis added).

203. ARIz. CONST. art. 2, § 8 (emphasis added).
204. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (emphasis added).
205. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 23 (emphasis added).
206. HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 6 (emphasis added).
207. ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 6 (emphasis added).
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unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other
means."
LOUISIANA:"' "[Elvery person shall be secure in his person, property, communications, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy."
MONTANA: 9 "The right of individual privacy is essential
to the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest."
SOUTH CAROLINA: 1 ' "The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures and unreasonableinvasions of privacy shall
not be violated. ...
WASHINGTON: 21 "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law."

TABLE 2
STATE STATUTES WITH PRIOR CONSENT
AND BUSINESS USE WIRETAP EXEMPTIONS

Arizona
Colorado
Delaware
Dist. of Columbia
Florida
Georgia

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3012 (1993)
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-305 (West 1993)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1336 (1993)212
D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-542 (1993)213
FLA. STAT. ch. 934.03 (1993)214
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-66 (Michie

Hawaii
Idaho

HAW. REV. STAT. § 803-42 (1993)
IDAHO CODE §§ 18-6702; 18-6720 (West

Iowa

IOWA CODE ANN. § 8082.B (1993)217

1993)215

1993)216

208. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 5 (emphasis added).
209. MONT. CONST. art. 2, § 10 (emphasis added).
210. S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 10 (emphasis added).
211. WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 7 (emphasis added).
212. Exempts interceptions by communications common
electronic communication service providers.
213. Exempts interceptions by communications common
electronic communication service providers.
214. Prior consent must be given by all parties.
215. Prior consent exemption only.
216. Exempts interceptions by communications common
electronic communication service providers.
217. Exempts interceptions by communications common
electronic communication service providers.

carriers, rather than
carriers, rather than

carriers, rather than
carriers, rather than
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Kansas

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4001; 22-2514 (West

Louisiana
Maryland

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1303 (1992)211

Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri

MINN. STAT. § 626A.02 (1993)

Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire

NEB. REV. STAT. § 86-702 (1993)
NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.620 (1993)
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 570-B:3; 570-A:2

1992)

MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10402 (1993)219
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-29-531 (1993)220
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 542.402 (Vernon
1992)221

(1993)222

New Jersey
New Mexico

N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:156A-4 (1994)223
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-12-1 (Michie

North Dakota
Ohio

N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-15-02 (1993)225
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.52 (Ander-

1994)224

son
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
Texas
Utah

1994)226

OKLA. STAT. tit. 13, § 176.4 (1993)227
OR. REV. STAT. § 165.543 (1993)
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5704

(1993)228

R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 11-35-21
TEX. PENAL CODE § 16.02 (West 1994)230
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23a-4 (1994)

218. Exempts interceptions by communications
electronic communication service providers.
219. Prior consent must be given by all parties.
220. Exempts interceptions by communications
electronic communication service providers.
221. Exempts interceptions by communications
electronic communication service providers.
222. Prior consent exemption only.
223. Exempts interceptions by communications
electronic communication service providers.
224. Exempts interceptions by communications
electronic communication service providers.
225. Exempts interceptions by communications
electronic communication service providers.
226. Exempts interceptions by communications
electronic communication service providers.
227. Exempts interceptions by communications
electronic communication service providers.
228. Prior consent must be given by all parties.
229. Exempts interceptions by communications
electronic communication service providers.
230. Exempts interceptions by communications
electronic communication service providers.

(1993)229

common carriers, rather than

common carriers, rather than
common carriers, rather than

common carriers, rather than
common carriers, rather than
common carriers, rather than
common carriers, rather than
common carriers, rather than

common carriers, rather than
common carriers, rather than
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Virginia
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
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VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-62 (Michie
W. VA. CODE § 62-1D-3 (1994)
WIS. STAT. § 968.31 (1993)
WYO. STAT. § 7-3-602 (1994)

1994)

